Here we argue for a conception of structural representations grounded in isomorphism as an alternative for linguistic representations grounded in causal correlation. We show that this conception can satisfy requirements such as Ramsey’s job description challenge and avoid the so called Hard problem of content and remain compatible with 4E cognition. We also argue that deciding whether a given cognitive capacity or performance is representational is a matter of empirical research on a case by case basis. We should avoid claiming that representations are broadly necessary/irrelevant when selecting our favorite time.
Abstract
Recent post-cognitivist approaches have raised sharp criticisms against the notion of mental representation, proposing instead to think of the mind and cognition in terms of embodied actions of an organism in its environment. While we agree with this conception, it is not clear that it necessarily implies the rejection of any kind of representational vocabulary. The aim of this paper is to argue that representations afford an additional explanatory dimension that’s unavailable through other means, and to suggest that, in at least some cases, they may participate in the explanation of cognitive performances or capacities. The presented notion of representation, as we will make clear throughout the paper, does not violate the methodological precepts most dear to 4E cognition in general and enactivism in particular, and can therefore be used as a useful theoretical tool in investigations about the embodied and situated nature of the mind.
Co-authors
- Felipe Carvalho
Language
Portuguese
DOI
Forthcoming in Lampião - Revista de Filosofia.